Ethnic Discrimination and Authoritarian Rule: An Analysis of Criminal Sentencing in China
Hou, Y., & Truex, R. (2022). Ethnic Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing in China. The Journal of Politics 84(4): 2294-2299.
This article presents the first analysis of ethnic discrimination in sentencing patterns in the People’s Republic of China, focusing on drug cases in Yunnan Province. We posit the problem minority hypothesis, which holds that discrimination in an authoritarian system emerges when an ethnic group becomes associated with behavior that generates social instability. On average, minority defendants in Yunnan receive sentences that are about 2.1–7.5 months longer than Han defendants who have committed similar drug crimes. Further analysis of data from all provinces reveals that this bias is largest for groups heavily involved in the drug trade.
Repressive Experiences in the China Field: New Evidence from Survey Data
Greitens, S. C. & R. Truex. (2020). “Repressive Experiences in the China Field: New Evidence from Survey Data.” The China Quarterly. 242: 349-375.
This paper examines the nature of China's current research climate and its effects on foreign scholarship. Drawing on an original survey of over 500 China scholars, we find that repressive research experiences are a rare but real phenomenon and collectively present a barrier to the conduct of research in China. Roughly 9 per cent of China scholars report that they have been “invited to tea” by authorities within the past ten years; 26 per cent of scholars who conduct archival research report being denied access; and 5 per cent of researchers report some difficulty obtaining a visa. The paper provides descriptive information on the nature of these experiences and their determinants. It concludes with a discussion of self-censorship and strategies for conducting research on China.
Focal Points, Dissident Calendars, and Preemptive Repression
Truex, R. (2019). “Focal Points, Dissident Calendars, and Preemptive Repression.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(4): 1032-1052.
This article explains temporal variation in repression as a function of the “dissident calendar,” the set of events that serve as natural focal points for coordination. The core argument is that regimes can anticipate the events that create these focal points and engage in preemptive repression to survive their passing. This dynamic produces predictable, often cyclical patterns in repression. An analysis of dissident detentions in China from 1998 to 2014 shows that “focal events” alone appear to be responsible for more than 20 percent of dissident detentions over the analysis period. Such detentions tend to be shorter and rely less on formal criminal procedures, suggesting a “catch-and-release” dynamic. Additional analysis of detentions in Tibet shows how the calendar may vary by issue or group.